Earhart's final blunder, If only she knew...
A more informed look at the crash of Amelia Earhart, also known as Amelia Bedelia.
Amelia Earhart is a very interesting historical figure.
The public perception of her accomplishments has become peculiarly conflicted.
We all perceive her as a strong, smart, and fearless woman who aspired to achieve great things no one had done before. We hear about how she attempted to be the first woman to circumnavigate the globe and how she tragically died while trying to locate an island to refuel her plane.
First, we should understand what she was trying to do. Humans had already circumnavigated the globe. The U.S. Army Air Service completed the first aerial circumnavigation in 1924 using four aircraft, taking off from Seattle and flying west (27,553 miles). The first single-crew circumnavigation was by Wiley Post, who successfully flew east from New York in 1931 and 1933 (approximately 15,500 miles), although it was all in the northern hemisphere and a shorter route than Earhart’s equatorial path. Earhart’s route was planned to cover 29,000 miles. It was a more direct circumnavigation but not unprecedented.
The reality of Earhart's character is not nearly as remarkable as people have made it out to be. Her life (and death) is a textbook case of unjustified hubris, which directly resulted in the plane missing the refueling island and crashing into the sea.
Earhart did not know what she was doing. She failed to communicate with the communication ship she relied on to locate her refueling point, misunderstood the radio equipment she was using, and made fatal decisions by removing critical radio equipment on the most important flight of the entire circumnavigation.
Most importantly, she didn’t understand why she wasn’t receiving a signal from the communication ship and failed to realize the single action she could have taken to save herself and her navigator, Fred Noonan.
This is the reality of the situation and undermines the narrative of the “strong, independent, fearless woman” who was a “great example” of attempting to make history and achieve great things. That’s not really what happened.
Amelia Bedelia, as I’ve come to call her after reading extensively about the nature of the crash, made a series of poor decisions that ultimately cost her life and the life of Fred Noonan, her navigator.
The rest of this article covers the finer details of the crash, and some of the actions she could have taken to prevent it. I admire the attempt to do something great of course, but we have to be honest in pointing out that a combination of courage and hubris don’t tend to produce good results.
Amelia Earhart, a pioneering aviator, embarked on a 29,000-mile circumnavigation of the globe along the equator, starting her second attempt on June 1, 1937, from Miami. By June 29, she had completed 22,000 miles, with the final leg from Lae, New Guinea, to Howland Island, a distance of 2,556 miles (2,200 nautical miles). She departed at 10:00 am local time, expecting a 20-hour flight, with the USCGC Itasca stationed at Howland to provide communication and navigation support. Howland Island, a flat, coral atoll, is 1.5 miles long, 0.5 miles wide, and only 20 feet high, making it challenging to spot. The ocean depth near Howland is 17,000–18,000 feet, complicating search efforts.
Her aircraft, a Lockheed Electra 10E, was equipped with advanced radio gear for the era, including an experimental Bendix receiver (150-10,000 Kcs, 5 bands, voice/CW/MCW, remote control) and a Western Electric Model 13-C 50-watt transmitter with channels at 500, 3105, and 6210 KHz. She also had a Bendix Type MN-20 rotatable shielded-loop antenna for direction finding and a 250-foot flexible-wire trailing antenna, which she removed in Miami to reduce drag and weight.
Critical Errors in Radio Communication Knowledge
Earhart couldn’t tune to the Itasca’s 500 kHz beacon on her main antenna, stayed on less effective frequencies like 3105 kHz and 7500 kHz, and didn’t remain on air long enough for Itasca to locate her.
Evaluation: Earhart’s radio equipment included channels for 500 kHz, but she removed the trailing antenna, which was crucial for receiving low-frequency signals like 500 kHz, a standard distress frequency. The Itasca transmitted its beacon on 7500 kHz, which was too high for her direction finder (DFs were effective below 1800 KHz), making it unusable for bearings. Her primary communication frequency was 3105 kHz, but the Itasca could only send Morse code on this, not voice, which she couldn’t use for direction finding. Her last transmission was at 08:43 GMT on July 2, 1937, reporting a line of position 157–337 degrees, and the search started an hour later, suggesting she didn’t remain on air long enough for precise location. Post-flight, amateur radio operators reported signals (e.g., Nauru on 6210 KHz at 0843-0854 GMT July 3, Wake on 3105 KHz at 0948, 1223 GMT July 5), but some were hoaxes.
Removal of the Trailing Wire Antenna
Removing the 250-foot trailing antenna to save weight weakened her ability to receive signals, especially on the critical 500 kHz she needed to receive signals from the Itasca.
The trailing antenna was removed in Miami, reducing her transmission power from 50 watts to ~0.5 watts on 3105 KHz and severely limiting reception on low frequencies like 500 kHz. This decision, made to reduce drag, compromised her ability to communicate effectively, especially for long-distance signals. The fixed Vee-configured wire antenna used afterward was inefficient, contributing to distorted transmissions.
Failure to Use the Loop Antenna
Earhart had a loop antenna but didn’t realize she could use it for direction finding, which could have helped locate Howland Island.
The Bendix Type MN-20 loop antenna was mounted above the cockpit and capable of taking bearings on Itasca’s signals. Historical analyses suggest switching to the loop antenna could have allowed her to take bearings on 7500 kHz or lower frequencies, potentially locating Howland. However, she had limited training on her new Bendix receiver, and it’s unclear if she attempted to use it effectively. The send-receive relay failure likely further complicated its use.
Failure to Verify Communication Plan
Earhart didn’t confirm frequencies, schedules, or Itasca’s capabilities, worsened by a half-hour time zone mismatch.
Earhart designated 7500 kHz for Itasca’s beacon, inappropriate for her DF, indicating a lack of verification. The Itasca couldn’t send voice on 3105 kHz, only Morse code, which she couldn’t use for direction finding, showing a mismatch in communication plans. There was a half-hour difference between Greenwich Civil Time (used by Earhart) and Naval time-zone (used by Itasca), potentially causing confusion in timing.
Conclusion:
Amelia Earhart’s final flight was marked by significant errors in judgment, particularly in radio communication and antenna management, which were compounded by fatigue, weather, and navigation challenges. Her removal of the trailing antenna, failure to use the loop antenna, and lack of verification with Itasca were critical mistakes that led to her inability to locate Howland Island. While external factors like Itasca’s limitations and the difficulty of the task played roles, her decisions were decisive. The most probable outcome is that she crashed into the ocean near Howland due to fuel exhaustion, though the Nikumaroro hypothesis remains a debated possibility.